A Transformational Moment In India’s Search For Regional Connectivity

In the last few weeks, India has come out with a robust articulation of its connectivity initiatives, trying to put its own imprint on the wider global economic restructuring. At the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)-India summit on Sept. 7, Prime Minister Narendra Modi proposed the establishment of a multimodal connectivity and economic corridor linking Southeast Asia to Middle East and Europe via India, suggesting that “along with shared s, regional unity, peace, prosperity and mutual trust in a multipolar world also bind” India and the ASEAN.

This was part of a 12-point plan that Modi outlined to give a boost to ASEAN-India ties. While it included steps like sharing India’s Digital Public Infrastructure Stack with ASEAN partners, ASEAN-India fund for Digital Future focusing on cooperation in digital transformation and financial connectivity, inviting ASEAN countries to join Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure and Global Centre for Traditional Medicine being established by WHO in India, it was the connectivity initiative that drew significant attention.

Yet, the real scale of New Delhi’s ambition became clear two days later when a plan to build a mega economic corridor linking India, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Israel and the EU through shipping ports and rail routes was unveiled at the G-20 summit in New Delhi as part of the Partnership for Global Infrastructure Investment. While U.S. President Joe Biden described it as a “game-changing investment” and the European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen underlined it as “a green and digital bridge across continents and civilisations”, Modi visualised the India-Middle East-Europe economic corridor (IMEC) as “a beacon of cooperation, innovation, and shared progress”.

The IMEC, of course, is aimed at making trading more efficient, thereby boosting economic cooperation and digital connectivity across the region and is likely to include a rail link, as well as an electricity cable, a hydrogen pipeline and a high-speed data cable.

But beyond leveraging economic efficiencies, the vision behind this project is clearly transformative as it treads on some serious geopolitical faultlines in the region and beyond. The India-Israel-UAE-USA quadrilateral platform has already begun to alter the strategic landscape of the Middle East and this corridor seems to be the first big deliverable from the track. Details of this very complex project will be revealed over the next two months as a working group has been given the difficult task of operationalising the grand ideas into reality on the ground.

Given that a large part of the infrastructure for the project is already in place, it certainly makes sense for the nations involved to leverage its potential for wider geoeconomic gains. But India seems to be indicating that it is not averse to a geopolitical reordering as well by melding together the eastern and western peripheries, thereby incorporating Southeast Asia too in the broader connectivity initiative. This will place India strategically at the very core of trade flows from Southeast Asia to the Middle East and Europe, unlocking the connectivity bottlenecks that New Delhi has traditionally encountered with Pakistan on one hand and China on the other.

It is tempting to look at the IMEC as a competitor to the BRI (Belt and Road Initiative). Though it is certainly the case that the opacity and Chinese control over BRI stand in stark contrast to the multiple stakeholder engagement and sources of funding in the IMEC, the BRI is a reality while the IMEC is still a work in progress. Many nations participating in the IMEC are also part of the BRI and whether it is the Haifa Port in Israel or Piraeus in Greece along the IMEC route, Chinese presence is all too visible. What IMEC can certainly offer, however, is a more efficient and reliable connectivity alternative to nations who are concerned about Chinese monopolisation of connectivity routes. 

The IMEC has to contend with other challenges as despite America’s efforts, Israel and Saudi Arabia still have no diplomatic relations. With reports that Saudis have suspended normalisation talks with Israel over the Palestinian issue, the difficulties are only going to increase in the near future. The Gulf Cooperation Council has also struggled over the years to conclude free trade pacts with the EU and India, underscoring the problems of envisioning a comprehensive economic corridor with logistical infrastructure and integrated chains.

Finally, New Delhi’s own track record with connectivity initiatives has been rather underwhelming. The 1,400-km trilateral highway, connecting India to Myanmar and Thailand, was first proposed in 2002 but it remains bogged down with delays. The security situation in Myanmar is unlikely to improve anytime soon and the prospects are not great that this highway project might come to fruition soon. India is also a party to a multimodal International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) with Iran and Russia since 2000 that aims to link India to Central Asia and Europe. New Delhi has tried to link the Chabahar Port which it is building in Iran to this corridor, but this project too has suffered from delays and western sanctions on Iran.

As India seeks to unshackle itself from the geographical constraints imposed by Pakistan’s recalcitrance and China’s growing aggression by leveraging its growing partnerships with Arabia and the West, this is a transformational moment that will achieve its full potential only if the ideas laid out at the G-20 can be quickly implemented. New Delhi, which is emerging as the critical anchor in shaping regional connectivity, will have to do some heavy lifting.